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Abstract
Recent research highlights the significant role of political ideological identities in America’s increasing political polarisation. In
line with social identity theory, self-placement as a US liberal or conservative predicts favouritism toward the ideological in-group
and negative attitudes and behaviours toward the outgroup. The theory also holds that the link between self-categorisation
and behaviour is mediated by the content of that identity, by what an individual believes it means to be a member of that group.
Although previous research has done much to analyse the differences between US liberals and conservatives on various a
priori dimensions, little work has been aimed at gaining a holistic account of ideological identity content from the individual’s
lay perspective. Through qualitative analysis of 40 interviews (20 liberals and 20 conservatives), this study identifies central
themes in the meaning self-identified US liberals and conservatives attribute to these labels and finds evidence for asymmetrical
constructions of these identities. The liberal participant group’s identity construction revolved around identification as, and
concern for, individuals, supported by reference to personal values and political issues and underpinned by a motivation to
move toward a more equal society. Conversely, the conservative participant group connected the understanding of their identity
directly to the political ideology of the nation through a thread of self-reliance and reverence for the national group. Implications
for political behaviour and the study of ideological identity are discussed.
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Since 1936, national polls have asked US citizens to self-categorise themselves on a political left-to-right spectrum
from ‘liberal’ to ‘conservative’ (Ellis & Stimson, 2012). The measure, however, has historically appeared to be of
limited use: party identification is a better indicator of voting intent, and ideological self-placement is only moder-
ately correlated with expert-designated sets of policy preferences (Converse, 1964; Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). But
the study of ideological identity as a driver of American political behaviour has recently re-emerged, this time
conceptualised as a social identity that contributes to US political polarisation. Specifically, it is argued that these
ideological self-categorisations underlie affective political polarization—the increasing dislike the American left
and right have of the other (Iyengar, Sood, & Lelkes, 2012; Mason, 2016). In line with social identity theory (and
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it’s extension, self-categorisation theory) (Tajfel, 1974; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), this in-
group favouritism and outgroup derogation can be seen as a consequence of citizens’ identification with their
ideological identities.
In mid-twentieth century America, the political left and right generally reflected support for, versus opposition to,
government intervention, respectively (Downs, 1957). Like other Western democracies, this link between left/right
divisions and economic redistribution policy has weakened in the US as post-materialist issues have gained polit-
ical attention (Dalton, Farrell, & McAllister, 2013; Dalton, Wattenberg, & Wattenberg, 2000; Inglehart, 1997). Over
the last fifty years, the left and right in America have increasingly polarised over a broader set of issues (Layman
& Carsey, 2002). From the 1960s, liberalism became more saliently associated with the Civil Rights Movement,
the Equal Rights Amendment, and Vietnam anti-war protests; social issues continued to become attached to
ideological labels with abortion, gay rights, affirmative action, immigration, and gun control creating political divides.
In addition to this extension of political issue associations, the US has seen significant political identity realignment
since the 1970s. Not only do liberals today overwhelmingly identify as Democrats, and conservatives as Republicans
(Levendusky, 2009), but these identities have also become increasingly homogenous in terms of race, geography,
and religion (Mason, 2018b). Social identity theory posits that the convergence and overlapping of social, ideolog-
ical and party identities (political ‘sorting’) eliminates the ability of identities to ‘cross-cut’ each other and therefore
create a more complex and inclusive identity structure (Brewer, 1999; Mason, 2016; Roccas & Brewer, 2002).
This political sorting in the US has had the effect of creating an in-group that is increasingly exclusive and important
to the individual. The theory also predicts that, when people self-categorise as a member of an important ingroup,
they tend to direct positive attitudes and behaviours toward the in-group and negative attitudes and behaviours
toward the outgroup. Recent research into the effects of political self-categorisation in the US appear to bear this
out. Political self-categorisation predicts political in-group favouritism such as increased activism (Huddy, Mason,
& Aarøe, 2015), and support for in-group policy proposals (Malka & Lelkes, 2010). It has also been associated
with a number of negative responses to the political outgroup including anger (Mason, 2018a) and distrust (Iyengar
& Westwood, 2015), and an unwillingness to engage in discourse with the opposition (Settle & Carlson, 2019;
Strickler, 2018). The way in which we think of ourselves politically can even influence our everyday interactions:
there is an increasing rarity of close personal relationships in the US across party lines (Iyengar, Konitzer, & Tedin,
2018) and US citizens are more likely to favour their political in-group in a variety of contexts, from online transac-
tions for goods and services (McConnell, Margalit, Malhotra, & Levendusky, 2018), to the awarding of scholarships
and jobs (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015; Johnson & Roberto, 2019). Indeed, prejudice against a person of opposing
political identity in the US was found to be more prevalent than racial prejudice (Iyengar & Westwood, 2015).
In spite of this evidence regarding the consequences of US political self-categorisation, the understanding of what
citizens mean when they self-categorise as a liberal or a conservative remains less clear. These meanings, or
identity content according to social identity theory, are integral to understanding the link between self-categorisation
and political behaviour (Huddy, 2001): the theory posits that individuals who self-categorise with an ideological
group will be driven to behave in accordance with what they believe it means to be a member of that group. The
content of identity has been shown to influence attitudes toward the other and possibilities of compromise in in-
tractable conflicts in Israel and Northern Ireland (Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Halperin, & Zafran, 2012; Kelman, 2001;
Livingstone & Haslam, 2008). Analogously, the meaning individuals associate with their US ideological identities
has the potential to elucidate US political behavior including political polarisation.
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US ideological self-categorisations have been analysed on various dimensions over the decades. In particular,
significant contributions have been made relating self-categorisations to political issue preferences (Abramowitz,
2010; Converse, 1964; Ellis & Stimson, 2012), social group evaluations (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Ellis & Stimson,
2012) and values (Jacoby, 2014; Peffley & Hurwitz, 1985; Rokeach, 1973; Tetlock, 1986). But little work has ad-
dressed these dimensions simultaneously and questions therefore persist as to the structure of ideological identities
and the relationship amongst the elements thought to comprise these labels (Feldman, 2013).
The current study seeks to contribute to the scholarship surrounding the content and structure of US political
ideological identities by holistically exploring the subjective meaning citizens attribute to liberal and conservative
labels. Understanding the way in which those who identify with left and right ideologies construct their in-group
identity may provide additional insight into the drivers behind the behaviours attributed to these US political iden-
tities in particular, and to political ideological identities more generally.
US Political Ideological Identity as a Social Identity
Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1974; Turner et al., 1987) suggests that the polarising behaviour in today’s US polit-
ical environment is a natural consequence of political self-categorisation. It posits that self-categorisation creates
a social identity that forms part of an individual’s self-concept, leading that person to favour and defend their in-
group as an extension of themselves, to adopt the attitudes and beliefs of a prototypical member, and to demonstrate
bias against and to derogate the outgroup.
Self-categorisation is the initial step in social identity theory: an individual must see themselves as a member of
a social group to be influenced by this membership (Turner et al., 1987). This identification with a social group,
such as a political ideological group, causes the individual to act according to what they believe to be that identity’s
content ormeaning. Social identity content has significant consequences for attitudes and behaviour, the connection
has been demonstrated in such diverse studies as those linking racial identity content with academic achievement
(Altschul, Oyserman, & Bybee, 2006), US national identity content with attitudes toward immigrants and nuclear
armament (Citrin, Haas, Muste, & Reingold, 1994; Kosterman & Feshbach, 1989; Sullivan, Fried, & Dietz, 1992),
and the content of Northern Irish Protestant and Catholic identities with aggression toward the other group
(Livingstone & Haslam, 2008). How individuals construct the content of their political identities has implications
not only for individual behaviour and attitudes, but also for how these groups may be mobilised by party elites,
the media, and other ‘entrepreneurs of identity’ (Reicher, Hopkins, Levine, & Rath, 2005). This is particularly true
for acquired (as opposed to ascribed) identities as the meaning attributed to the identities will not only impact the
consequences of the identity, but also its voluntary adoption (Huddy, 2001).
The content of political ideological identities, like all social identities, are multidimensional and subjective, reflecting
an individual’s perception of the norms of the group (Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004). Norms for an
ideological identity such as ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ may include the personal characteristics, behaviours, and
values ascribed to group members, political issues and beliefs, objectives ascribed to the group, and the positioning
of the groups in relation to each other and to the nation (Ashmore et al., 2004; Goncalves-Portelinha, Staerkle, &
Elcheroth, 2017; van Dijk, 2006). The meaning that individuals attribute to their ideological identities may therefore
include, to various degrees, the political issues, social evaluations, and values in the previous research discussed
below.
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Such a definition of identity content stands in contrast to Converse’s (1964) definition of ideology as having the
kind of constraint found in elite discourse. Identity content most certainly reflects the influence of elite discourse,
but it may also include a number of other factors. Indeed, Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009) describe ideology as
an elective affinity that marries individual differences (personal values, personality traits) and socially created
representations of what the labels mean. We therefore employ the broader definition offered by Gerring (1997,
p. 980): “Ideology, at the very least, refers to a set of idea-elements that are bound together, that belong to one
another in a non-random fashion” as more likely to holistically capture citizens’ perspectives on their ideological
identities. To this definition, we add a clarification that political ideology is a belief system that is socially shared
(Jost et al., 2009; van Dijk, 2006).
US Political Ideological Identity as Political Issue Preferences
In 1964, Converse published his seminal work concluding that, unlike political elites, the majority of American
citizens did not hold a consistent set of liberal or conservative political issue positions—the American public was
‘innocent of ideology’. Fifty years on, Converse’s finding still holds true: self-identification as a liberal or conservative
in the US is only moderately correlated with expert-designated left-right issue constraint (Ellis & Stimson, 2012;
Kinder & Kalmoe, 2017). This continuing inconsistency between ideological self-identification and citizens’ issue
positions led Ellis and Stimson (2012) to draw a distinction between operational ideological identity (the extent to
which the issues that citizens support are considered to be liberal or conservative) and symbolic ideological
identity (the extent to which individuals see themselves as a liberal or a conservative).
The tracking of operational and symbolic ideological identities over a number of decades reveals a paradox: while
a majority of Americans are operationally liberal, only a minority are symbolically so; and although more than 70
percent of self-categorised liberals hold operationally liberal social and economic views, less than 30 percent of
self-categorised conservatives hold conservative views on both social and economic dimensions (Ellis & Stimson,
2012). The misalignment between citizens’ self-identified ideology and their support for that ideology’s elite-des-
ignated policies underlines the question as to what citizens mean when they identify as a conservative or a liberal
if not ‘the’ collection of left or right leaning issues. The content of Americans’ ideological identities—the meaning
that they attach to these labels—appears to include elements other than, or in addition to, such policy preferences.
US Political Ideological Identity as Social Evaluation
While operational ideological identity is seen to derive from specific political issues, the meaning attributed to the
‘remaining’ (symbolic) ideological identity has primarily been described in terms of the social groups with which
the terms ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ are associated (Conover & Feldman, 1981; Ellis & Stimson, 2012; Kerlinger,
1967). Symbolic ideological identification can be thought of as stemming from the social psychological evaluations
that individuals hold of groups such as minorities or religious groups that have become linked with either liberal
or conservative identities. Such groups represent “dominant cleavages in society” (Conover & Feldman, 1981,
p. 643) and liberal and conservative self-identifiers are theorised to evaluate the political identities in light of how
they feel about the associated groups.
In an application of this perspective, Ellis and Stimson (2012) theorise that liberalism became increasingly unpop-
ular as the majority of Americans disassociated themselves from the symbols with which this label became linked
in the 1960s: blacks, labour unions, and urban unrest. The term ‘liberal’ is much maligned by press and politicians
of the right, contributing to this label’s unpopularity. Conversely, the researchers concluded that individuals who
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describe themselves as conservative may do so due to its accuracy in describing their religious (defined as a
strict interpreter of the Bible) or social (measured in terms of a person’s child-rearing views) perspectives. Other
work posits that both ideologies are influenced by evaluations of key social groups with labour unions, feminists,
and environmentalists more positively evaluated by the left and big business, Christian fundamentalists, and the
military by the right (Zschirnt, 2011). Both the positive evaluations of these groups and the hostility toward them
were found to be important sources of US liberal and conservative self-identifications.
The Value Basis of US Political Ideological Identity
The structure proposed by Ellis and Stimson (2012) bifurcates ideological identity, acknowledging content contri-
butions from political issue positions and from social evaluations. This dyad does not separately account for the
approach that argues that values underpin political ideological identity (Caprara, Schwartz, Capanna, Vecchione,
& Barbaranelli, 2006; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010). Exploring the relationship between
ideological identities and personal values in an Italian sample, Schwartz et al. (2010) employed the widely-accepted
Schwartz Values Survey (Schwartz, 1992), finding that liberals and conservatives occupy opposite ends of the
personal values circumplex structure, where liberalism is connected with the basic values of universalism,
benevolence, and self-direction (collectively the ‘openness’ and ‘self-transcendence’ values), while conservatism
is linked to the basic values of security, conformity, and tradition (collectively the ‘conservation’ and ‘self-enhance-
ment’ values).
Political values have also been employed to distinguish between the US left and right. Unlike personal values
however, there is no widely accepted set of political values, particularly across countries. In the US, the analysis
of the association between ideological identity and political values typically revolves around the putatively core
American values such as freedom, equality, and individualism (self-reliance). While both the left and right are
associated with the idea of freedom, the left is more typically associated with the value of equality and the right
with individualism. In the psychological literature however, these associations have found mixed support amongst
researchers according to the method of enquiry. For example, operationalisations of equality demonstrate asym-
metry between the two ideologies in their support for the value (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003;
Rokeach, 1973). In contrast, other researchers have found a high level of support for the principle of equal treatment
on both the American left and right when participants are asked about the value directly (Citrin, Reingold, & Green,
1990; Hanson & O’Dwyer, 2018; Theiss-Morse, 2009). Such inconsistencies suggest a disconnect between how
researchers and (particularly conservative) participants define these values—understanding how individuals incor-
porate these values into their ideological identities may provide insight into this incongruence.
Separate from—but related to—personal values, a distinction has also been made between the types of morals
espoused by US liberals and conservatives. Moral foundations theory (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009) has asserted
that US liberals are guided by the morals of fairness and care; conservatives are likewise guided by these two,
but are also directed by morals of loyalty, purity, and authority. Fairness and care are considered to be ‘individu-
ating’ morals—morals that focus on individuals as the locus of moral value; while purity, loyalty and authority are
considered ‘binding’ morals as they focus on the group (Graham et al., 2011).
The Structure of US Political Ideological Identity
Not only is the content of liberal and conservative identities likely to be multi-dimensional, but the structure may
also be asymmetrical. Limited evidence from open-ended questions regarding partisan identity point to possible
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asymmetry in the content of US liberal and conservative identities. Grossmann and Hopkins (2016) argue that
the two US parties are not mirror images of each other; instead, they are different kinds of parties: while the Re-
publican party serves as a vehicle for an ideological movement, the Democratic party is a coalition of social groups.
Decades of American National Election Studies (ANES) open-ended question responses regarding what participants
like and don’t like about each of the main political parties reveal differing ‘levels of conceptualisation’. Using a
method initiated by Converse (1964) and updated most recently with the 2000 ANES (Lewis-Beck, Norpoth,
Jacoby, &Weisberg, 2008), the content of participants’ answers to these questions have been categorised according
to whether they invoke ideological (relying on a relatively abstract dimension) or ‘group benefits’ (expected treatment
of different social groups) talk in their descriptions. In these analyses, there has been a clear difference in how
Democrats and Republicans describe the two parties: Republicans have consistently described both parties in
terms of ideology while Democrats describe the parties in terms of group benefits (Grossmann & Hopkins, 2015).
Evidence of asymmetrical partisan identity structure was also found when Democrats and Republicans were
asked to provide descriptive words that were then sorted into ‘traits’ and ‘groups/issues’, where Democrats used
personal trait terms far more than Republicans (Rothschild, Howat, Shafranek, & Busby, 2018). Although political
parties may be a more tangible basis for self-categorisation (as a group with designated actors, platforms, and
symbols), it is possible that these partisan differences may also be apparent in ideological identities described by
the participants in this study.
The Current Study
In the current polarised environment, understanding the content and structure of ideological identities is particu-
larly important. Take for example the bifurcated structure of ideological identity proposed by Ellis and Stimson
(2012). This structure has led some to hypothesize that there are two types of political polarisation: affective po-
larisation and issue-based polarisation (Iyengar et al., 2012; Mason, 2018a). Affective polarisation is attributed to
symbolic ideological identification, while issue polarisation is attributed to operational ideological identification.
Others, however, maintain that affective polarisation is not a separable phenomenon, being itself centred on issues
(Webster & Abramowitz, 2017), thereby integrating the cognitive (issues) and evaluative (affective) elements.
Each theory implies a different structure of ideological identifications and source of political disharmony.
The current study aims to more fully apply the social identity framework and contribute to the study of ideological
identities by exploring the meaning that those who identify as either liberal or conservative attribute to those US
political ideological labels. Through semi-structured qualitative interviews with participants across a wide ideolog-
ical spectrum, this study identifies how participants constructed their ideological in-groups and outgroups. The
goal of the research is to describe the structure and content of these identities from the perspective of the partici-
pants and to highlight aspects of identity interpretation and positioning that may have consequences for the study
of political behaviour.
Method
This study examined representations of the primary US ideological identities (liberals and conservatives) through
semi-structured online synchronous and asynchronous text interviews. A qualitative approach was selected to
best capture the complexity and self-reflective nature of these social identities.
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Participants
We recruited a sample of 40 participants for this study (20 self-categorised liberals and 20 self-categorised con-
servatives) using opportunistic and snowballing sampling methods. Although not meant to be a representative
sample, we aimed to balance gender and to ensure participation of a variety of generations, geographies, and
income levels. Liberal participants were from six different states (California, Iowa, New York, Oregon, Texas,
Virginia) and Washington D.C., while conservative participants were from ten different states (Arizona, Florida,
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, New York, North Carolina, Montana, Texas, and Virginia). The two groups were relatively
demographically balanced in relation to one another, as indicated in Table 1 below.
Table 1
Participant Demographics, in Number of Participants
Conservative groupLiberal groupDemographic category
Gender
712Women
138Men
Generation
12Silent
53Baby Boomer
1011Gen X
44Millennial
Average age and SD , SD = 12.56M = 48.63, SD = 15.49M = 45.85
Income
12< $50,000
53$50,000 - $100,000
1011$100,000 - $200,000
44> $200,000
Race
1916White
13Hispanic
01Asian
Employing a convenience sample as a basis for understanding perspectives in a population as wide as the US
electorate has several limitations. Such a participant group, although geographically and generationally diverse,
is not a nationally-representative sample. For example, in comparison to voter turn-out, Gen X voters are over-
represented (52% of participants in this study/26% of voters), with the Silent (8% of participants/14% of voters)
and Boomer (20% of participants/35% of voters) generations underrepresented by the same (Pew Research
Center, 2017); likewise, the participants’ average income is higher than a nationally representative sample. A
convenience sample, particularly one in which a high level of motivation is required to complete the study task
(the interview), may over- or under-represent certain perspectives.
Potential participants were identified through the first author’s extended contact network, they were solicited ini-
tially via e-mail and asked to indicate their interest and informed consent by completing a survey that collected
demographic and contact information via a web link. Upon receipt of the survey, the first author contacted the
participant to arrange an interview time. No participants were considered to have specialist political knowledge.
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In partial compensation for their participation, the researcher contributed $10 per participant to one of four charities
selected by the participant on the survey. The research received a favourable ethical opinion from the authors’
university.
Procedure and Materials
Seeking to gain a multi-dimensional and person-centred perspective on the content and structure of political ide-
ologies, the study collected qualitative interview data. The aim was to explore participants’ representations of
ideological labels by asking them to engage in a certain level of reflexivity about their ideological identity and beliefs.
Aware of the current contentious political US environment, we were also keen to employ a format that minimised
the threat of direct confrontation and the social pressure of response that exists in a face-to-face interview. Because
ideological identities are voluntary social identities created through social interaction, the interview context (as
social interaction) has the potential to affect the data collection if the participant would seek to establish social
confirmation of their opinions either directly or from the interviewer’s body language. To this end, the interviewer’s
ideology was not communicated to the participants directly, and we sought to de-personalise the interview context
by conducting interviews via instant messaging platforms (except in four cases where e-mail was used at the
participants’ request). The greater visual anonymity in text-based interviewing has been shown to increase self-
disclosure and alleviate some of the influence of social desirability on participant response (Joinson, 2001). The
contra-argument for anonymity is that such protection may have the effect, as is often seen on social media, of
allowing for more extreme views. In addition, text-based interviewing does not allow for subtleties of facial expres-
sions and mannerisms to be collected as data, although these were not considered integral to the aims of this
study. The format is also limited in that it requires some level of typing ability and there is little control over partic-
ipant distractions. To further advance the objectives of comfort and reflexivity, and based on pilot testing of the
questions, sample questions were included in the recruiting letter.
The semi-structured interview schedule included approximately 10 open-ended questions that focused on partic-
ipants’ representations of the in-group and the outgroup. Typical questions were, “what is a liberal?”, “what is a
conservative?” and “do you consider yourself to be a typical liberal/conservative?”. By allowing the participants
to discuss both their own and the opposing ideology, the interview schedule aimed to capture what participants
felt were valued differentiators between the two ideological identities. Interviews were all conducted by the first
author and were most commonly completed after 60-75 minutes, although some took up to 2 hours. Most interviews
were completed using iMessage and Skype (35), but email (4) and Google Hangout (1) were also used. Two
participants completed the interview using their phone, while all others used a laptop to participate.
The data were collected in January and February 2018, one year into Donald Trump’s presidency. Both the
Senate and the House were held by the Republicans. Although there were no particular prominent issues in the
media during this period, in Trump’s first year he had failed to deliver the Republican healthcare reform bill to repeal
the Affordable Healthcare Act (Obamacare), but had removed certain environmental protections, cut taxes for
corporations, estates and individuals, and signed an executive order to limit immigration from specific countries
for security purposes (the “Muslim ban”). There was little evidence that any particular current issue had an impact
on this study.
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Data Analysis
The interview transcripts were imported into MAXQDA 2018, a qualitative analysis software application, for organ-
isation and coding. A form of thematic analysis was chosen to explore the data due to its epistemological and
analytical flexibility (Braun & Clarke, 2006). An inductive approach was taken, ensuring a bottom-up analysis of
the data rather than one driven by particular theoretical objectives. We were, however, alert to the idea-elements
that would constitute the content and structure of a social identity including political policy preferences, values,
and social evaluations, as well as other items that might comprise a shared representation of the two identities
including the positioning taken by participants in relation to their own and the outgroup.
All analyses were conducted by the first author. Prior to initial coding, the data corpus was read and re-read. Initial
thematic codes were then generated using a line-by-line approach, ensuring that all of the data were given equal
attention. With a view to capturing both the underlying structure of the ideological identity and its content, coding
identified both semantic and latent items. In this initial coding, codes were assigned to the entire collection of data,
participant by participant. The data were again reviewed by grouping the responses by ideology. This review
generated additional codes related to areas of consensus as well as those that distinguished between the ideologies,
and the body of data was re-reviewed in light of these additional codes. Codes were then pruned to identify and
consolidate themes, and these themes were reviewed based on their relevance to the research question. The
themes were then named, defined, described and interpreted. Lexical searches were employed to enhance theme
analysis.
Primary themes, including the in-group norms and positioning for each group (liberals and conservatives), are
discussed in an integrated fashion below. These themes collectively create a narrative for the content and structure
of each ideological identity.
Findings
The purpose of this study was to investigate the content and structure of US liberal and conservative ideological
identities through the meaning participants attributed to them.We found that participants constructed their identities
through a number of elements: self-attributions, interpretations of the group ideology, and the positioning of their
in-group identity in relation to the outgroup and to the nation. The extent to which the descriptions invoked differing
types of content—personal attributes, political issues, personal and political values, and representations of the
nation—followed certain patterns within the two ideological identifications. The liberal narrative generally revolved
around the individual while the conservative narrative most often reflected political ideology and symbols of the
nation. Liberal participants constructed their ideological identity from a personal perspective, citing personal values,
morals and attributes together with a motivation to progress toward a more equal society. Conversely, conservative
participants’ ideological identities were constructed as stemming directly from an American political philosophy,
a perspective that equated conservatism and American national identity.
Three main themes were identified in each of the two groups. These themes were Issues make a movement; My
politics, myself; and Don’t label me for the liberal group; and It’s Political, I’m with the Group, and Conservatives,
to Me, are Really True Americans for the conservative group.
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The Liberal Identity: Individuals and Issues
Liberal participants articulated ideological identities that included few specifically political values. Indeed, liberal
participants generally resisted categorising themselves as a typical liberal. Descriptions were largely comprised
of a collection of political issue positions and personal attributes that centred on concerns for individuals.
Issues Make a Movement
Political values were not primary in liberal participants’ talk about their ideological identities. When asked to define
a liberal in this study, only one liberal participant noted the broad principles commonly attributed to US liberalism
of either ‘civil rights’ or ‘equal rights’, and the word equality was mentioned by just six of the liberal participants in
the whole of the data. That is not to say that these principles were not important to the participants, but that it is
not in broad political principles that the liberal participants expressed their ideological identity. They did however
often cite a variety of political positions that could be seen as having their purpose in achieving a more equal so-
ciety. A lexical search indicated that about half of the participants referred to expanding healthcare and the same
proportion referenced education in their talk (both longstanding central issues of the US political left); there was
otherwise a wide diversity in the issues indicated as core to the liberal ideology, varying from intersectionality
(how different types of discrimination interact) to job retraining for the new economy, and from Native American
issues to the environment.
While the liberal participants appeared to see themselves as proponents of specific issues; their link between
these issues and a national political ideology was rarely articulated, and perhaps even resisted. Participant 7L
described her position as follows:
The liberal ideology itself is not important to me, because it is the SYSTEM of ideas and ideals. I look at
each individual issue rather than the whole system.
This talk clearly puts issues ahead of a stated ideology. In fact, “what defines a liberal will inherently change because
of the progressive nature of the beliefs” (Participant 5L). This response abrogates an opportunity to define ‘liberal’
in terms of core values, but instead links the definition to progress generally, presumably linked to support for
certain issues. This statement also suggests that the heterogeneous issues may be connected in a common vision
of the strategic project that is broader than national political ideology—progress toward a better world, without
impediment to individual expression: “People just need to be able to be who they are. Without judgements.”
(Participant 4L), “I think itʼs wanting to make sure all people have what they need to be the best version of them-
selves.” (Participant 10L). This talk speaks to a value of freedom—freedom for citizens to realize their true self
through a greater degree of equality. Rokeach (1973) proposed that both liberals and conservatives hold freedom
in high regard, while liberals also highly value equality. Building on this, Tetlock (1983, 1986), proposed that
holding these two conflicting values drives the more complex decision-making and communications of the left.
The talk in this study demonstrates a process that liberals may use to reconcile these values: by defining freedom
not as ‘freedom from government intervention’ (as is typical of conservatives) but as ‘freedom of expression’, and
providing equality as the means to provide this freedom.
These representations of shared vision provide little expressed evidence of a commonly employed national polit-
ical doctrine, common phrases or vernacular in liberal participants’ discussion of their ideological identity. Liberal
participants positioned themselves as moving toward a shared representation of a better way of life, while specific
political issues were conceptualised as the milestones that are to be achieved in moving toward this ideal. It is
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possible that this heretofore unknown world state is difficult to visualise and agree upon, and therefore remains
unarticulated. Alternatively, a persistent absence of political ideological talk in American left-leaning discourse
may be intentional—undertaken both to avoid ideological conflict with self-categorised conservatives by focusing
on the liberal issues that appeal to this group as operational liberals and to appeal to liberals’ group interests
(Grossmann & Hopkins, 2016).
My Politics, Myself
In addition to issue positions, liberal identifiers often described their ideological label in terms of personal values
and behaviours. The extent to which these elements were equated with being a liberal was notable not only because
of its semantic consistency within the liberal participant group, but for its latent meaning. This talk was often in
response to the prompt, “What is a liberal?” (a question ostensibly about political ideology, not personal attributes).
By invoking personal attributes in response to this question, the participants have brought forth the importance
of these elements and have positioned the individual at the centre of the identity. This structure indicates a ‘bottom-
up’ influence on political beliefs: the individual, not a prescriptive group ideology, was seen to inform liberal political
values.
Participants positioned the US liberal in-group as open, caring and outward-looking; they saw themselves as self-
and societal- improvers, “seeking to better themselves and society” (Participant 10L). Consistent with research
that correlates measures of the value of openness with liberal self-identification (Schwartz et al., 2010), being
‘open’ was seen by participants as core to the American liberal identity. Participant 17L connected his personal
outlook to being a liberal in this way:
I know I enjoy a variety of cultures, a variety of people, I still love to learn and explore, and I think that is
the basis of who I am. I find humor in the absurd and as my mother always said it is better to laugh than
cry. I seek to find solutions and don't see most things in life as insurmountable but instead to find ways
to solve problems and meet people part way without either having to capitulate.
This multifaceted description has openness at its core, defined both as tolerance and as learning. Such a definition
reflects the personal values of self-direction and universalism between which liberal political values were found
to be positioned in an Italian sample (Schwartz et al., 2010). Openness was most often cited as intellectual curios-
ity, as described by Participant 8L:
For me, a liberal equates to being open to an array of ideas and perspectives. Continually exposing
yourself to new ideas, ways of thinking, etc., with the express intent of broadening your perspective.
Challenging yourself to avoid the trap of egocentricity by tapping into views that may differ from your own,
experiencing different cultures and being open to adapting, continually seeking new information/learning,
etc.
Participants frequently discussed the critical evaluation that openness affords. This positioning has the effect of
validating not only the attribute of openness (because it allows for better reasoning), but it also lends validity to
the liberal issues that are the outcome of critical thinking. Importantly, it sets critical-thinking liberals against con-
servatives who blindly follow ideology. Frequent references were made to the perception that American liberals
are “educated” – not necessarily formally, but in the sense of being informed on historical or political issues. Lib-
eral participants positioned themselves as thinkers who are hungry for information, and as being in control of their
ideas.
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I think a liberal is someone who is balanced, uses their intellect, values that consider the best outcomes
for making life decisions and is open to possibilities that go beyond ones (sic) own limiting life experience.
I think openness is the key. (Participant 17L)
Here, we again note that political ideas and behaviours are driven by the individual.
Conservatives, on the other hand, were seen by liberal participants as either selfish or as victims of their upbringing,
their religion, and their geography – factors that were seen to keep conservatives from the advantages of experience
or education that would open them to more liberal ideas. Conservatives were seen as “crazy uninformed” (Partic-
ipant 12L), and as having been duped by those in power and their doctrines.
And, honestly, I really donʼt think itʼs 100% their fault; when you trust the wrong politicians or the wrong
religious doctrines or believe incorrect facts and figures, this is what happens. Theyʼre scared and angry
because people have promised them things or told them things arenʼt true. They donʼt understand that
the people they trust are actually the people that are making money off of the lies they tell them. They
donʼt understand that they are being kept where they are because it benefits the people who put them
there and are keeping them there. Itʼs actually pretty sad, really. (Participant 10L)
This positioning by liberal participants of US conservatives as being blinded by socially constructed belief systems
is set in contrast to the liberal individual-driven beliefs. The talk cast conservatives as either allowing themselves
to be dictated to by societal constructs or as victims of their environment and of elites, setting this against liberals’
self-positioning as the more aware, outward-looking, and personally in control of their values. Attributing conser-
vatives’ positions to their environment also serves to invalidate conservative positions while allowing liberals to
not violate their value of openness to all perspectives. This observation also offers an interesting comment on the
‘ideo-attribution effect’ phenomenon wherein liberals have been noted to make situational attributions for social
problems, while conservatives tend to make personal attributions (e.g. Sniderman, Hagen, Tetlock, & Brady,
1986). Liberals’ tendency to ascribe conditions such as poverty and unemployment to environmental causes has
been attributed to reasoning motivated by the need to eliminate the cognitive dissonance that personal responsi-
bility for one’s social or economic woes would create for liberal egalitarian values (Skitka, Mullen, Griffin, Hutchinson,
& Chamberlin, 2002). For the liberal participants in this study, there should be no such value conflict related to
the idea that conservatives may be responsible for their own political attitudes—yet the situational attribution
persisted. This continuity of attribution type where there is little political ideological value conflict suggests a driver
not confined to the political realm.
Don’t Label Me
The importance of individuality to the US liberal identity also came through in liberal participants’ assessments of
their prototypicality. Of the 20 participants who identified as liberal in this study, only four gave an unqualified “yes”
when asked if they were a typical liberal. Generally, participants expressed an uneasiness with defining typical
members of the group (e.g. “Is there a typical liberal? [Participant 7L]). Participants perceived the group as having
such diversity that a prototype was impossible to imagine: one-quarter of the liberal participants indicated that
they weren’t sure what a typical liberal was or if one actually existed. This perceived ingroup heterogeneity (as
compared to the conservative participant group, described below) again speaks to a greater personal, over group,
identity (Brewer, 1993). Participants commonly qualified their typicality for their geography, age, or social group:
HA! I don't consider myself too typical in any way. But among the people that I live around in NYC and
identify with I would be somewhat typical. As part of a larger nation, less typical. (Participant 3L)
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Other participants qualified their typicality for their level of political sophistication: being “more pro-business”
(Participant 1L), “more informed” (Participant 10L), “further along on the advancement of social issues” (Participant
3L), “more aware” (Participant 18L) ormore “active” and “intersectional” (Participant 12L) than most. Again, none
of these qualifications revolve around a discrepancy in beliefs, they are personal attributes, behaviours, and envi-
ronmental influences, consistent with the higher level of trait responses found in Democrats (Rothschild et al.,
2018). This positioning both speaks to the perception of the American liberal group as a collection of individuals
rather than a group of shared national political ideology; it also supports Ellis and Stimson’s (2012) assertion that
there is a reluctance to identify with the liberal label in the US—even those who do embrace this label tend to
deny typicality. Ellis and Stimson attribute the reluctance to identify as liberal to the negative symbols of blacks,
unions and urban unrest associated with the label, but our work offers an additional explanation regarding the
incongruences between operational and symbolic ideological identities. The persistent theme of individual expression
and the condemnation of blind acceptance in liberal participants’ talk raises the possibility that their political
identity is seen as a personally derived set of issue positions. Such an individual identity construction might defy
ascription to a pre-ordained set of political values or beliefs and could be more resistant to political ideological
labelling of any kind regardless of the symbolic associations.
The relationship between liberal participants and their political labels was further illuminated in talk regarding their
related political party. Although some participants saw the Democratic party as too slow and subject to the corrupting
influences of power and money, most participants cited little difference between being a liberal and being a
Democrat, noting that, although not highly aligned with the participants’ beliefs, the party is the “only game in
town” (Participant 11L).
There really isn't much of a choice at this juncture to be other than democrat if you are a thinking human
being with a concern for the welfare of others. My moderate tendencies are to take people as they are
and help them move forward without hard line absolutes. For me the democrat thing is by process of
elimination and the independents are often coming from an unrealistic place that has no hopes of accom-
plishing something. (Participant 17L)
Together, these observations position both the liberal and Democratic identities as simply “best fit” conduits for
what these participants generally described as a personal ideological identity. In sum, liberal participants appeared
to conceptualise their identity first and foremost as a confederation of individuals who possess particular person-
ality attributes, personal values and a vision of a better, more equal, world where individuals are able to fully express
their personalities and talents. Political ideology was positioned as the result, not the driver, of these representations.
The Conservative Identity: Ideology and The Nation
Unlike liberal participants in this study, conservative participants saw themselves as typical group members and
clearly articulated their ideological group’s political beliefs and goals—a system closely linked to the nation.
It’s Political
The conservatives in this study characterised their ideological identity as consisting of a defined set of national
political values: limited government, adherence to the constitution, and self-reliance. As Participant 17C concisely
expressed, a conservative is…
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An individual who respects the constitution of the United States, believes in a society where if you work
hard you are allowed to keep the gains of your efforts and you are not unnecessarily burdened by federal
or state interference.
In contrast to liberal participants’ ‘personal values’ definition of their group, these beliefs are clearly political: Par-
ticipant 17C refers to the US, to society, and to federal and state governments. The participants’ most common
directly noted political belief was limited government, characterised as a founding and Constitutional American
value (the alignment of the conservative and American identities is discussed in the section below).
Although not generally referred to directly when prompted to define a conservative, woven throughout participants’
talk was the central and pervasive belief uniting the conservative identity: self-reliance.
I believe in personal responsibility. First and foremost get your own house in order before you worry about
anybody else’s house. (Participant 7C)
Self-reliance was seen to be demonstrated at an individual level with personal fiscal responsibility and a sound
work ethic. Participant 20C explains the personal importance:
As I grew older and had kids I more and more thought about what things would be like for them when I'm
gone from this earth. It became more evident to me that the work ethic that my parents and grandparents
instilled in me was THEmost important gift they ever gave me. It is the key to success. I wanted my children
to know and understand that they were the masters of their own destiny and did not need the government
to help succeed. If they worked hard enough they could do/become whatever they desired.
Similar to the liberal participants’ valued traits of openness and tolerance, self-reliance was a behaviour that
conservative participants value in themselves and expect of others and of their country. Participant 1C illustrates
this by contrasting herself and a colleague:
I worked with a guy named Matt. I was talking with he and his wife at a dinner one night. They just found
out they were expecting and had already decided his wife was not going back to work after having the
baby. I was surprised. I knew that they could not live on one salary. Neither of them went to college. He
said he couldn't afford it and he didn't want to have tons of loans to pay back. I explained that I went to
college and my parents didn't pay for anything. I worked all through school and had financial loans. It took
me about five years to pay off the loans but I had a degree that allowed me to have a career instead of
just a job. Yes it took time and it was very hard at times but it was worth it. They both said that was stupid
and that they could get jobs anytime they wanted. I in a very nice way asked how they would manage
with one income. They said that they could get assistance because he only made so much and that she
wasn't working. They were only 23 yrs old. I couldn’t understand why they were married and having a
child when they could not afford to live on their own. This is not what they were thinking?????
This passage supports the narrative of benefits recipients choosing to rely on the state for support, a scenario
that is in direct opposition to the US conservative principle of self-reliance. Participant 1C hints at an argument
put forth by a number of other conservative participants: assistance programs degrade individual character and
society by undermining self-reliance. The programmes were variously characterised as supporting “a destructive
lifestyle" (Participant 1C), noting that “recipients never learn to fend for themselves” (Participant 13C), as “detracting
from that [work] ethic and reducing the individuals (sic) feeling of self-worth” (Participant 20C), and as taking away
from our children the “opportunity to succeed or fail or to make it on their own” (Participant 9C). This line of argument
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2019, Vol. 7(1), 378–401
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v7i1.1062
Hanson, O’Dwyer, & Lyons 391
positions US liberal policy as robbing current citizens and future generations of an important personal character-
istic that is seen as the key to both personal and national success. This position takes the welfare debate beyond
a simple ‘free-rider’ issue to a discussion about personal and national character.
I’m With the Group
The majority of conservative participants considered themselves to be typical without qualification. In participants’
descriptions, there was a clear prototype of a conservative. If participants did not consider themselves to be pro-
totypical, the reasons they cited were differences in political issues. Notably, the majority of conservative participants,
without prompting, indicated that they considered themselves to be socially moderate/liberal, most often citing
being “ok with gay marriage” (Participant 4C), but there were also single instances of varying from prototype on
abortion (Participant 6C) and by being irreligious (Participant 17C). None of these positions were perceived to be
in conflict with seeing themselves as a typical conservative. Such a definition stands in contrast to what is gener-
ally regarded as conservative values, including those positions used to assess operational ideological identity.
Not unusually—yet in contrast to the liberal participant construction—the conservative ideology was constructed
as a social group defined primarily by members’ beliefs in the conservative political philosophy.
Ellis and Stimson (2012) describe self-identified conservatives who hold liberal political positions ‘conflicted con-
servatives'. The researchers attribute this conservative peculiarity to self-interest: in spite of their ascribed ideo-
logical identity of limited government spending, citizens prefer liberal policies that confer benefits and services
(e.g. Medicare) when they are asked to make decisions on a policy-by-policy basis. Our analysis indicates that
the phenomenon may not be limited to a policy-by-policy context. Participants' conscious acknowledgement of
their liberal social stances did not keep them from identifying as a typical conservative, and their fiscal concerns
revolved around fiscal responsibility, not simply less spending. This inconsistency not only attests to the strength
of the conservative group identification, but also raises a question regarding the operational definition of generally
accepted ‘conservative' positions. If the majority of conservatives don't hold conservative policy positions, perhaps
the positions considered to be conservative by political scientists (often based on the willingness of citizens to
spend more or less government money) do not reflect those considered to be conservative by the general public.
After all, political ideology is a social representation, an object constructed from public opinion (Jost et al., 2009);
what defines conservative positions should therefore reflect shared opinion—not simply the views of political ex-
perts—if we are to advance an understanding of US conservatism. This area requires additional work to more
fully understand this incongruence, but our work suggests that there may be space in the content of the conser-
vative identity for what is currently considered to be liberal policy.
Unlike their ideological group membership, there were a significant number of conservative participants who dis-
tanced themselves from the Republican party. In line with conservatives’ traditional support of limited government,
this reluctance to identify with the party appeared to be primarily due to participants’ distaste for politicians gener-
ally, noting that they felt closer to their ideology than to their party. Participant 1C noted “I used to consider myself
a republican but feel that the word is more about power than it is about what is best for our nation”. Such claims
are consistent with the right’s traditional distrust of government, but they may also be due in part to participants
wishing to distance themselves from unpopular actions of the current Republican president. However, Participant
15C put it this way: “Being a conservative is about principles. Being a Republican is about policy”, where principles
are seen as closer to the identity of the right.
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Conversely, there was also evidence that the Republican identity may be more salient for some. Participant 10C,
when asked to define a conservative, was confronted with the idea that she did not meet her own definition as
“trying to uphold the traditional values and religion” because she “support[s] gay marriage, etc.”. She worked out
the inconsistency, unprompted, as follows:
Participant 10C: “republicans are conservatives”
Interviewer: “Yes, that’s generally true. Are you saying that you are a Republican?”
Participant 10C: “I’m a republican..”
Interviewer: “And how do you think conservatives and Republicans differ?”
Participant 10C: “I don’t think they do. that’s the reason i say I’m a conservative bc I’m a Republican”
This priority of party over ideology was mirrored in the priority of candidate over ideology that the participant later
noted in her family’s political behaviour:
so I'm from a very small town in South Texas. my sister's and my brother vote on whoever my mother
tells then to vote for. my mother votes for whoever this person knows.
Together, this contrasting identity priority illustrates the significant influence of social influence on political identifi-
cation, not only on whether citizens identify on the left or right (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960), but
also on the priority of these political identities.
“Conservatives, to me, are really true Americans” (Participant 3C)
Conservative beliefs, as communicated by the study’s participants, were commonly equated with American values,
success, and strength; a number of conservative participants positioned themselves as the defenders of American
political philosophy, while liberals were often equated with or seen as “heading toward” (Participant 18C) socialism:
“Today's liberal in the USA reminds me of what I would call socialism.” (Participant 9C). By assigning liberals this
political ideology, conservative participants both carry over the strong ideological framing of their in-group to discuss
the outgroup and position the outgroup as un-American.
The left has gone so far now that its (sic) as if they don't understand our Constitution or the principles of
Capitalism. They, for some bizarre, ideological reason, believe Venezuela or Cuba are a better model.
They crave socialism. They live in the wrong country if that is what they want. The "left' (liberals) in our
country, at this point, are pushing socialism/ communism with thought control, speech control, etc. (Par-
ticipant 8C)
Socialism as a threat was mentioned specifically by seven of the conservative participants (note that no liberal
participants mentioned the word socialism), indicating that it was an entire ideology, not just particular issues or
values, that was perceived as a threat. By constructing the US political conflict as a battle between two ideologies
(American and non-American), conservatives firmly align themselves as the defenders of the country. Participant
3C described the conflict as follows:
our society has been infected with socialism and entitlement. those that are holding true to American
values are fighting back. we need to remind ourselves what it means to be an American. and those that
can’t support who we are need to either move or frankly shut up/back off. this is our constitution and who
we are. those socialist views don't belong here. we need to eradicate socialism.
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This talk directly links the US conservative self to the nation, with conservative political beliefs at the epicentre.
Conservative values were conceptualised, not as an independent political philosophy, but as the same as the
American founding philosophy.
Positioning conservative and American political philosophy as one in the same allows conservatives to gain a
moral high ground as defenders of the nation against the invading philosophy, it increases the importance of
fighting for conservative values against the un-American liberal aggressor. The association of socialism with lib-
eralism is clearly embedded in the conservative discussion. The anti-American connotations of this ideology may
offer another reason for operational liberals to distance themselves from the liberal label: Democrats as well as
Republicans highly value their American identities (Huddy & Khatib, 2007).
Conservative participants’ American identity was an important social identity for the conservative participants and
talk linked conservative principles to the country’s perceived strength, position in the world, and success:
It is more about creating a country that you are proud of and you want to be a part of. I think conservative
values allow the United States to continue down a similar path of those who founded our country. In my
opinion it will make us stronger as a country than if we were to adopt more liberal principles. like when
the United States is seen as a world power who will help those who need it, but will still stand up against
those whose values are in direct opposition to ours. (Participant 6C)
Conservative values were also credited as providing the political philosophy for allowing for “a strong foundation
for innovation” (Participant 20C). America’s past success was often attributed to the “freedom” afforded by con-
servative policy:
a while ago, i did some research on inventors. I found that most of the great inventors came from America.
I find that fascinating. it means, to me, that in a truly free society, you have the ability to create and rise
above all else. and, society will benefit great inventors don't come from places like North Korea....which
means someone is giving them the technology (Participant 3C)
It is in talk of this type, citing past success as a validation of conservative values, that conservative participants’
reverence for what they see as their conservative/American political philosophy becomes apparent. American
history was seen as “something that should be honored and revered not changed for the sake of change or change
because itʼs of popular opinion or simple fallen out of favor” (Participant 7C). This attribution of liberal change as
short-sighted and as lacking in respect for the nation was common and is consistent with positioning conservatives
as the defenders of the nation. Most conservative participants discussed US liberals as naïve:
[A liberal is] an individual who really doesn't understand the cause and affect (sic) of individuals actions.
Is not realistic with their ideals and the entire population. (Participant 1C)
They were generally seen as having little awareness of the threat their policies pose to the nation and to the
freedoms of other Americans: they were seen as well-intentioned but ignorant.
Conservative participants appeared to revere and to identify with the concept of the American nation, its political
philosophy and its strength and position in the world. By self-identifying as conservatives, they are also identifying
as defenders of the American political philosophy. This pervasive alignment speaks to a value that moves beyond,
and may operate at a different level than, the traditional political values of freedom, equality, and individualism.
Reverence for the nation was a key component of the conservative ideological identity. This finding is in line with
the moral foundations theory of conservatives tending to support group-enhancing morals (Graham et al., 2009).
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The group, in this case, being the nation. Indeed, in a geometric model of individual value choices, Jacoby (2014)
found that support for patriotism was a key differentiator between liberals and conservatives. Further, this group-
enhancing value stood in opposition to the individual-oriented values of equality and freedom.
Conservative participants’ ideological adherence enabled them to readily envision a prototypical member and to
provide clear and consistent meaning for the conservative identity. This engagement with the US conservative
identity suggests that this group would lend itself more easily to mobilisation. In addition, with national identity
being one of the most accessible and powerful identities for mobilisation (Billig, 1995), the alignment with national
values gives conservatives and the Republican party access to a social identity that is highly and chronically
salient. By ‘owning’ American values, conservatives are able to easily cast liberals as the un-American outgroup,
and associating conservativism with the country’s strength implies that alternative policies may be a threat to this
strength. This narrative offers the conservative identity as a means by which citizens may express their support
for American values. Not only does this positioning give an advantage during settled times, but any external threat
to the country is likely to result in citizens moving toward conservativism as a way to express their American
identity, such as in the period following September 11, 2001 (Li & Brewer, 2004).
The conservative participants’ simpler messaging is consistent with previous research (e.g. Tetlock, 1983) and
has been associated with a less complex style of issue evaluation by conservatives (Tetlock, 1986). From a group
perspective, this nationally-linked, consistent messaging also promotes unification of the US conservative group
and stands in contrast to liberal messaging. The conservative participants’ association between conservative and
American values faced little counter-narrative from liberal participants, a pattern that exists in the wider public
(Gidron, 2018). The lack of ideological talk provides no counter for conservative discussion: US liberals may have
little national or political ideological language with which to engage conservatives in what conservatives might
feel is the central debate. While conservative participants appeared to prefer to discuss political values, liberals
were more likely to focus on issues. When no ideological counter-narrative is offered by liberals, those on the
political right may fill this void—as the conservative participants in this study did—with their own choice of ideolog-
ical vernacular: socialism.
Conclusion
Liberal and conservative participants’ construction of their ideological identities differed in both structure and
content. Liberal participants’ talk centred on the individual, both in terms of the individual values and characteristics
that define the liberal identity and in the concerns for individual freedoms (defined as personal expression). They
represented themselves as a highly diversified group that eluded prototypicality, often eschewing the ‘typical lib-
eral’ label, but they found commonality in personal values and the shared ambition of a better world. Conservative
participants were more apt to embrace their ideological label and to discuss group norms and concerns in ideo-
logical terms, both political and national. They positioned themselves as defenders of the nation against the threat
of socialism and the weakness of character that it engenders. These participants closely linked their personal,
political and national identities through the thread of self-reliance – seen as the key to the nation’s past and future
success – and reverence for the nation. In both groups, individual freedom was paramount: liberal participants
extolled the need for individual expression, while conservative participants valued freedom from government in-
terference.
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The elements employed by liberal and conservative participants to construct their ideological identities were
asymmetrical. Where liberal participants used political issues and a future world vision, conservative participants
employed national political ideology. Supporting and extending the two ‘levels of conceptualisation’ originally
identified by Converse (1964) (the tendency for Republicans to describe parties in ideological terms and for
Democrats to use group interest references), and recently discussed by Grossmann and Hopkins (2016), our
findings suggest that US ideological identities are multi-faceted structures in which liberals and conservatives
employ political issue preferences, national political ideology, and world vision asymmetrically. Further, these
differing levels of conception mirrored representations of different group concerns. Liberal participants’ discussion
of individual rights and oppressed groups contrasted with conservative ideological talk that aligned itself with
American values—concerns related to individuals versus concerns related to the nation—a division similar to the
contrast between individuating and binding moral values (Graham et al., 2009). These identified asymmetries
highlight the identity elements that may be most salient for group mobilisation, conflict, and political communication,
suggesting a number of avenues for future research.
The ideological/individual centres of concern framed the threat each group felt from the other. According to liberal
participants, the threat posed by conservatives is to individual expression and is caused by conservatives’ blind
devotion to their political, national, or religious ideology. The threat posed by liberals, according to conservative
participants, is centred on their support of the un-American ideology of socialism, cast as a threat to America’s
strength and character, undermining the key value of self-reliance and contrary to the founding values of the nation.
These representations of the outgroup may be used to stir intergroup hostility in political communications, fuelling
polarisation and jeopardising policy negotiations. Being alert to the source of an outgroup’s concerns and their
perceptions of one’s in-group (regardless of the perception’s accuracy) can create the space that allows a group
to create an alternative narrative. For example, the current study highlighted the narrative of ‘assistance programmes
undermine the American value of self-reliance’ in conservative participants’ talk. Framing assistance programmes
as a nation-enhancing may offer more opportunities for cross-party communication by offering a platform from
which to discuss what is an important identity for the conservative group. Future experimental work could explore
the impact of messaging that differentially appeals to these facets.
Although the study reflects perspectives on ideological identity from a geographically and generationally-diverse
group of participants, it is not a fully representative of the electorate. We may therefore be missing certain perspec-
tives on the content of these ideologies, and the findings cannot be generalised. Our work may however serve
as the foundation for future work surrounding the conceptualisation and consequences of American and other
left/right ideological identities. With the increasing prominence of non-economic issues and the decline of political
party attachments, the meaning and role of left and right political ideological identity is changing, not just in the
US, but across affluent democracies. Although the current study is specific to the US context, the general finding
of asymmetrical identity content structure (of individual or group ideological perspectives) between the political
left and right may provide useful means by which to discuss other political ideological and party identities
throughout the world. In addition, exploration of the significant role of national reverence on the US right and the
relationship between this group-enhancing position and the traditional equality and freedom values of liberal
democracy may illuminate identity structures related to populist movements in other geographies.
Our study provides evidence that US ideological identities are multi-dimensional structures in which liberals and
conservatives to differing degrees embrace concerns for individuals and for ideologies, differentially employing
social representations of political policy issues, personal and political values, national ideology and world vision.
Journal of Social and Political Psychology
2019, Vol. 7(1), 378–401
https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.v7i1.1062
The Individual and the Nation 396
This work adds to the growing body of research that employs social identity theory to conceptualise political po-
larisation; it elaborates on the content of ideological identities while also contributing to the study of ideological
asymmetries. Conceptualising ideological identities as different types of identity may not only inform social psy-
chological models of affective political polarisation by providing insight into the behaviours that are the consequence
of ideological identification, but may also offer new strategies for political communication and policy negotiation.
Awareness of these contrasting identity constructions and understanding that the two groups may be advocating
different, but not inherently opposite, elements allows more space for compromise by identifying areas that may
be most available for negotiation, a step toward reducing US political polarisation.
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